In political campaigns, candidates often avoid taking positions on issues, instead making vague statements that conceal the policy preferences that would guide them if elected. The explanation for ambiguity proposed in this paper is that voters do not understand the informational content of a non-announcement. If voters are Bayesians, unraveling occurs, with only the most extreme candidates remaining ambiguous. However, if voters under-appreciate the relationship between candidates preferences and their strategies, more moderate candidates may also choose to be vague. This paper develops a model of candidate competition in which candidates can choose whether or not to announce their policy preferences to voters and applies Eyster and Rabin's (2005) concept of cursed equilibrium, which allows for varying degrees of understanding of the connection between type and strategy.
Introduction
In political campaigns, candidates often avoid taking positions on issues, instead making vague statements that conceal the policy preferences that would guide them if elected. For example, Tomz and Houweling (2009) analyzed statements made regarding tax policy by the presidential and vice-presidential candidates in 40 primary debates (25 Democratic, 15 Republican) and four general election debates during the 2007-08 election cycle. They found that over half of such statements were ambiguous. For example, a candidate might say that he would not increase taxes, but he would not reveal the magnitude of the decrease in taxes that he supported. Given such a statement, voters would be left unsure whether the candidate would enact extreme tax cuts, moderate tax cuts, or leave tax rates as they were.
The existence of such ambiguity is a fundamental puzzle in political economy. Since a representative democracy relies on having elections to choose officials who will make important decisions, it is crucial that the electorate be able to select a candidate who represents its interests. When voters must choose candidates without knowing their policy intentions, it seems likely that elections will not be able to serve this function. An understanding of why politicians choose to be ambiguous will help society to form policies that will make it more likely that elections serve the public interest. This paper proposes a novel explanation for ambiguity in elections: voters do not fully understand the informational content of a non-announcement. If voters were fully rational, they would be able to infer that the fact that a candidate chooses to conceal his preferences actually reveals information about those preferences: they must not be congruent with the voters' preferences. However, if voters do not follow this reasoning, then candidates may actually be able to conceal their preferences by making vague campaign statements.
As in many economic contexts, information asymmetries abound in political environments. As such, the tools and insights from analysis of games of incomplete information played in economic environments also apply to many problems in politics. This paper focuses on a particular asymmetry: politicians have more information about their own policy preferences than their opponents and the electorate have. The key feature of signaling games is the opportunity for a player whose type is unknown by other players to choose an action that will be observed by other participants. If the payoffs associated with taking various actions differ by type, then a player's decision to choose one action over others may reveal information about his type to the other players.
In the classic example of the used car market from Akerlof (1970) , a seller knows the quality of his car, but potential buyers do not. There, the unknown type is the quality of the car. An owner of a low-quality car will have a low valuation and be willing to accept a low price, while an owner of a high-quality car will prefer to keep the car for himself rather than selling for a low price. Therefore, buyers can make inferences about the value of the car after observing an action taken by the seller: his willingness to sell the car at a given price.
Analogously, in the environment studied in this paper, the type of a candidate is the policy that he would like to implement, known only to himself. During the campaign, candidates may choose to announce their preferred policies to voters. Since a candidate's willingness to reveal his true policy position depends on the likelihood that announcing it will garner support from the electorate, a candidate's decision to conceal his preferred policy may actually reveal information about that policy to voters. More concretely, consider the following example, in which citizens must elect a representative who will make a decision regarding gun control policy. Suppose that the median voter prefers a centrist gun control policy: mandatory registration and background checks. There are two political parties, each Returning to the familiar used car example, Akerlof argues that if buyers are naively willing to pay the expected value of a car, owners of high-value cars will not be willing to accept this price. Buyers then infer that only below-average cars are in the market, and they would be willing to pay the expected value of a below-average car if this were the case.
However, given this buyer behavior, only cars of very low value, below the expected value of below-average cars, would be in the market. The result of iterating through this logic is that the used car market will not exist, because buyers would infer from a seller's willingness to participate that the car up for sale is a lemon.
Similar logic applies in the election example. A centrist candidate will not want to pool with less desirable candidates and will clearly choose to announce his preferred policy.
Suppose first that only centrist candidates make announcements. If voters update correctly, they would infer that a Left politician who made no announcement either wants to ban assault rifles or also wants to ban handguns. Therefore, a moderate-Left politician would be more appealing to voters if he revealed his preferred policy than if he pooled with extremists by taking no position. Thus, only the extreme candidates could possibly remain silent; regardless of whether they announce their true preferences or try to conceal them, voters would infer that they are "lemons."
The standard model of play in games of incomplete information assumes that players are able to go through the train of logic outlined above and update their beliefs about other players' types correctly. However, the unraveling process may break down if voters lack sufficient cognitive ability or are simply unwilling to pay the effort costs that may be required to think through a complex game. If when a candidate takes no position, voters (mistakenly) put enough weight on the candidate being a centrist, they would instead prefer the candidate who took no position to a candidate who revealed himself to be moderate-Left or moderate-Right. If candidates anticipate this voting behavior, then moderate Left and Right candidates may also choose to remain vague rather than making a policy announcement. In this way, ambiguity in politics may be a response by candidates to voters who are affected by this behavioral bias when forming beliefs about candidates.
This paper develops a game-theoretic model that formalizes the ideas described above.
In the model, an election is held to select a candidate who will implement one of five possible policies. Each player receives a payoff that depends only on how close the policy implemented is to his preferred policy. The median voter prefers the centrist policy. There are two candidates, one from either side of the political spectrum. Each candidate prefers either the centrist policy, a policy that is moderate within his party (henceforth, simply moderate), or an extreme policy; the candidates' preferred policies are private information.
In the baseline analysis, it is assumed that each candidate chooses to announce his preferred policy or to take no position. Intuitively, this reflects that politicians cannot credibly promise to implement policies that they do not support. This case will be referred to as the announcement game.
The model is solved using the solution concept of cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin (2005) . When a voter is "cursed," she under-appreciates the relationship between a candidate's type (his policy preference) and his campaign strategy. Her posterior beliefs about the types of the candidates following the campaign stage are a convex combination of her prior beliefs and the true Bayesian posterior beliefs. This modeling assumption captures the idea that a person may accurately predict the distribution of actions taken but have incorrect posterior beliefs about a player's type given the action taken by that player. The cursed equilibrium model allows for varying degrees of strategic sophistication, and it has two special cases. If voters are not cursed (believe that candidates always play their type-specific strategies), this concept is simply Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This generates the unraveling logic described above, which leads only the most extreme candidates to have an incentive to take no position. On the other hand, if voters are fully cursed, they do not update their beliefs at all based on actions taken by other players. In this case, when a voter sees that a candidate does not make a policy announcement, her belief that the candidate has a given policy preference is simply her prior belief that the candidate has that policy preference, based on the distribution of candidate preferences. The model also allows individuals to be partially cursed, which means that they are not completely naive but still do not fully understand the relationship between preferences and strategies. policy. Candidates thus face a trade-off between increasing the probability of winning the election by choosing a policy that the voter prefers and being able to implement a policy that he prefers conditional on winning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review.
Section 3 analyzes a model in which candidates decide whether or not to announce their preferred policies to voters before the election. Section 4 extends the model to allow candidates to commit to any policy. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature in economics and political science that attempts to explain the prevalence of ambiguity in campaigns.
One class of explanations views ambiguous statements by candidates as responses to true voter preferences. Shepsle (1972) makes an important theoretical contribution with an extension of the Downsian model in which candidate strategies are probability distributions, instead of points on a subset of the real line. He shows that, when voters care intensely about getting their most preferred option and experience diminishing sensitivity further away from their bliss points, a challenger can defeat an incumbent whose position is known by choosing a non-degenerate lottery, rather than committing to a single point in the policy space. On the other hand, if voters are risk-averse, a candidate should not take actions that would make voters uncertain about his policy position (Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) Given the present ubiquity of polls in the time leading up to elections, explanations that rely on having enough of this uncertainty may not seem as plausible as they did even a few years ago. The model presented below drops the assumption of uncertainty about the location of the median voter, implying that the only motive for keeping quiet about one's policy position is to conceal a preference for an unpopular policy.
Somewhat similarly, ambiguity may be a response to uncertainty about the optimal policy that will not be resolved until after the election. Aragonès and Neeman (2000) posit that ambiguity exists in elections because candidates care directly about being ambiguous, because they would like to have the flexibility to adjust policy if necessary. In their model, there exists a trade-off between giving the median voter what she wants in order to get elected and remaining ambiguous to have the flexibility once in office. This mechanism may be at work in reality; this channel is shut down in the model described in this paper, because there is no shock to policy preferences after the election takes place.
This paper is not the first work to point out that voters should make inferences about the types of candidates who would choose to be vague; Chappell (1994) This paper proposes a new explanation for why policy-motivated candidates are sometimes able to get away with not making policy announcements during campaigns. Ambiguity has a benefit for policy-motivated candidates who do not agree with the median voter, because it gives them the opportunity to implement their preferred policies without having to run on them. The contribution of this paper is to identify a novel mechanism that has not been discussed in the existing literature. It provides a view of political competition as a signaling game played by actors with less than complete cognizance of that strategic environment. Future work should do more to connect these disparate explanations, but an understanding of this key mechanism is a prerequisite for such work.
Announcement Game

Environment
The purpose of the election is to select a candidate who will implement one of five possible policies. There are two policy-motivated candidates 1 , one from each side of the ideological spectrum. The reader may think of them as being randomly chosen (or chosen based on characteristics that are orthogonal to policy preference) from two entrenched political parties.
Candidate 1 may prefer policy A, B, or C, and Candidate 2 may prefer policy C, D, or E.
There are N voters distributed across the policy space, and the median voter prefers policy C.
2
The overall distribution of candidate preferences is symmetric, and this distribution is common knowledge. Let π i j be the probability that Candidate i's preferred policy is j. Since the distribution is symmetric, the notation can be simplified by writing
Each player receives utility based on how close the implemented policy is to his preferred policy; payoffs are described in more detail below.
Candidates are purely policy-motivated and receive no additional reward from holding office.
In this game, all candidates will implement their preferred policies. The decision for a candidate in the campaign stage is whether or not to reveal this preferred policy to voters.
Timing
The timing of the announcement game is as follows:
Stage 0 : Nature draws a preferred policy for each candidate, and each candidate learns his own preferred policy.
Stage 1 : The candidates simultaneously choose campaign strategies. Each candidate chooses whether to reveal or conceal his preferred policy.
Stage 2 : Nature determines whether voters will observe 3 each candidate's policy preference announcement. With probability γ ∈ (0, 1) , any announcement made by a candidate will be seen by voters; with probability 1 − γ , voters will see that the candidate took no position, regardless of the strategy he chose. Realizations are independent across candidates.
All players in the game understand that strategies chosen by candidates are translated with some noise into platforms observed by voters in this way. To clarify the difference between what the candidates choose and what the voters observe, the actions chosen by the candidates will be referred to as strategies, and the campaign messages viewed by the voters after Nature has moved will be referred to as platforms.
Stage 3 : Voters observe the campaign platforms and choose their preferred candidates.
If a voter is indifferent, she abstains. 4 The candidate with the most votes wins the election and implements his preferred policy. If both candidates receive the same number of votes, a winner is chosen at random, with each candidate having an equal chance of being chosen.
Stage 2 exists for technical reasons; allowing the no position platform to occur with positive probability regardless of the strategies chosen implies that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept can be used without the need for refinements. Suppose to the contrary that a candidate has perfect control over whether or not his preferred policy is revealed to voters.
If all candidates choose to reveal their positions in equilibrium, then Bayes' Rule does not prescribe beliefs if a voter observes the off-path action of taking no position. This paper deals with this technical issue by introducing a source of uncertainty and taking limits as γ approaches one (voters always observe the chosen strategies).
Payoffs
Each player chooses his strategy to maximize his expected utility. Suppose that, as illustrated in the introduction, each policy can be represented by a point on the real line, with one unit of distance between each pair of adjacent policies. Each player i receives utility payoffs that depend on his preferred policy, denoted by x i , and the policy implemented,x. Let z i denote the distance between player i's preferred policy and the policy implemented:
z. This assumption implies that u is decreasing in the distance between the preferred policy and the policy implemented. φ is a constant set such that u(4) = 0. This normalizes the utility function, assigning the value 0 to the greatest distance between policies possible in this environment.
If f (·) is a convex function, as is commonly assumed in the literature, then players are risk-averse with respect to policies. For example, the median voter (who prefers C) would prefer to implement B/D for sure to a lottery that gives equal probability to C, B/D, and
A/E (an expected distance of 1). In contrast, if f (·) is concave, then the opposite is true. In this case, players care intensely about receiving their preferred policies and are less sensitive to differences between policies further away from the preferred policy.
The utility function was defined above in a way that facilitates these comparisons between other this and other papers. However, for ease of notation, define the following values: for
. It may also be easier for the reader to remember that the index one corresponds to the best possible situation, in which the preferred policy is equal to the policy implemented. u 2 is the utility received from the second-best policy, and so on.
Equilibria
Let θ 1 and θ 2 denote the types of Candidate 1 and Candidate 2, respectively. A strategy for Candidate 1, σ 1 (θ 1 ), is a mapping from preferred policy θ 1 ∈ {A, B, C} to campaign action a 1 ∈ {θ 1 , ∅}; he chooses whether to announce his preferred policy or to announce nothing. The strategy for Candidate 2, σ 2 (θ 2 ), is defined analogously. Let z 1 and z 2 denote the platforms of Candidate 1 and Candidate 2, respectively. Recall that due to Nature's move in Stage 2, z j = a j with probability γ and z j = ∅ with probability 1 − γ. A strategy for voter i, σ vi (z 1 , z 2 |χ i ), is a mapping from observed candidate platforms z 1 and z 2 to a voting action a vi ∈ {1, 2, 0}. She chooses whether to vote for Candidate 1, vote for Candidate 2, or abstain (denoted by 0) after viewing the platforms. Her strategy may depend on her cursedness parameter χ i , which will be defined below.
The following definition applies the standard Bayes-Nash equilibrium solution concept to this game.
Definition 1 The Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the announcement game is a strategy profile
σ BN and set of beliefs π θ|a for voters such that
For each voter
(θ 2 ), and her beliefs π θ|a .
Each voter forms posterior beliefs π θ|a using Bayes' Rule.
In the definition of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the notation in the voters' strategies that allows the strategies to depend on χ is suppressed because it is not relevant for this solution concept. Given that all voters form beliefs in the same way and have identical preferences over policies, all voters have the same equilibrium strategies in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
When a voter observes that a candidate takes no position, she must form beliefs about the candidate's preferred policy, since that is the policy that he would implement if elected. Due to Nature's move at Stage 2, there is always positive probability that a candidate's platform will be "no position". 
For each voter
, and her beliefsπ θ|a . Candidates are assumed to be Bayesians, though this is without loss of generality in the announcement game. Since a cursed candidate would correctly predict the average distribution of votes (while making mistakes regarding the choices of individual voters), he does correctly anticipate the behavior of the median voter. As will be shown below, candidates play weakly dominant strategies in equilibrium; therefore, beliefs about the behavior of the opponent, which would be distorted by cursedness, do not affect candidates' behavior.
Each voter i forms posterior beliefsπ
Unless stated otherwise, all results regarding equilibria refer to cursed equilibria; however, since Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a special case of cursed equilibrium with χ = 0, these results also apply to Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Attention is restricted to equilibria in which players do not choose weakly dominated strategies. This rules out the possibility that a voter would be indifferent between the candidates because she believes that her vote will not be pivotal.
Under this assumption, one can model a voter's decision problem as if she alone determines the outcome of the election. Since there are only two candidates and there is no cost of voting, voting for her favorite candidate based on the policy she expects him to implement if elected weakly dominates all other voting strategies.
Voters' decisions are straightforward given most combinations of candidate platforms.
If candidates reveal that they prefer policies that would give the voters the same payoff, then voters would be indifferent between the two candidates and would abstain. If both candidates reveal preferences, but Candidate 1's preferred policy gives the voters a higher payoff than Candidate 2's preferred policy, then the voters would vote for Candidate 1.
Voters would also vote for a candidate who revealed that he prefers C over a candidate who took no position, and would vote for a candidate who took no position over a candidate who revealed that he prefers A/E. For voters, the interesting choice is between a candidate who announced a preference for B/D and a candidate who took no position.
The choice of a candidate who has the same preferred policy as the voters is simple, and candidates who prefer C reveal that preference in all possible equilibria. Additionally, it is straightforward to show that candidates who prefer A/E do not reveal their preferred policies in equilibrium. A voter prefers a lottery over implementing A/E, B/D, and C to a candidate who has revealed A/E. Therefore, taking no position is a weakly dominant strategy for candidates that prefer A/E, because it does strictly better when the opponent reveals A/E and is at least as good as revealing A/E against all other strategies. Therefore, equilibria differ only in the strategies chosen by candidates who prefer B/D.
Because there is some probability that Nature will prevent a candidate from credibly announcing his preferred policy, there will be uncertainty about the preferred policy of a candidate who takes no position. However, it may be possible that almost all information about candidate types is revealed. If only one type of candidate chooses to take no position and γ is close to one, then the probability that a candidate who has taken no position is of that type is very high. The label attached to the equilibrium defined just below derives from this fact. 
In the limit as γ → 1:
A cursed voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no position:
In the limit as γ → 1:π
Because there is some chance that a candidate whose platform is "no position" did not choose "no position" as a strategy, uncertainty about the preferred policy of a candidate who took no position remains. The effect on beliefs of adding this uncertainty does not require cursedness as a mediator. However, as the chance of Nature preventing a candidate from revealing goes to zero (as γ approaches 1), the beliefs of a Bayesian voter converge to putting full probability on that candidate preferring A/E. In contrast, a cursed voter may believe that a candidate who takes no position prefers B/D or C even when γ = 1. The following proposition uses Lemma 1 to show that, when facing Bayesian voters, candidates that prefer B/D are better off revealing their preferred policies than concealing them.
Proposition 1
In the limit as γ → 1, the near-revelation equilibrium exists as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Since only candidates who prefer A/E choose to take no position in equilibrium, a
Bayesian would know that, in the limit as γ → 1, a candidate who took no position must be a candidate who prefers A/E. Given the voters' behavior, the best response of a candidate who prefers B/D is to reveal his preferred policy, since he would be more likely to win the election by doing so than by taking no position.
In order for the near-revelation equilibrium to exist, even with Bayesian voters, it must be the case that voters would vote for a candidate who revealed himself to prefer B/D over a candidate who took no position. As γ approaches one, the equilibrium will exist regardless of the other parameter values. However, given the uncertainty about the preferred policy of a candidate who took no position caused by γ, it is otherwise necessary to ensure that voters do not prefer a candidate who took no position. If the distribution of preferences were skewed toward centrists and voters' preferences were sufficiently convex over policies, then voters would prefer a candidate who took no position, even if only candidates who prefer
A/E actually choose to do so. Introducing γ alone thus can potentially break down the unraveling argument.
The next proposition analogously considers the existence of the near-revelation equilibrium when voters are cursed.
Proposition 2 As γ → 1, the near-revelation equilibrium exists as a cursed equilibrium if and only if
Given the distribution of candidate preferences and the median voter's preferences over outcomes, there exists a threshold degree of cursedness; if the median voter is sufficiently close to Bayesian, then the near-revelation equilibrium exists. In Proposition 5 below, it will be shown that χ N R ∈ (0, 1) if
. In this case, if the median voter is sufficiently cursed, then the near-revelation equilibrium does not exist for all paramter values. This is true even as the probability that a candidate will be prevented from revealing his preferred policy goes to zero; cursedness alone can prevent the existence of the near-revelation equilibrium.
Cursed voters do not understand how unlikely it is that a candidate who took no position would implement the voters' preferred policy, since their beliefs are formed as if other types of candidates also sometimes may choose to take no position. If this mistake leads the updated beliefs to not move too far away from the priors, then these voters would prefer a candidate who took no position to one who revealed B/D; in this case, candidates who prefer B/D would choose to deviate from their equilibrium strategies of revealing their preferred policies.
However, if
, then χ N R ≥ 1, and the near-revelation equilibrium exists, regardless of the degree of cursedness. This condition holds if and only if the median voter prefers receiving u 2 for certain to a random draw from the distribution of candidate preferences. The cursed equilibrium model implies that the most optimistic belief that a voter may hold about a candidate who takes no position is that he is a random draw-rather than disproportionately likely to be an extremist. If the median voter still prefers a candidate who would implement policy B/D, even if fully cursed, then cursedness has no effect on the predictions of the model; the near-revelation equilibrium exists.
Alternatively, candidates who prefer B/D may choose to take no position by making ambiguous campaign statements.
Definition 4 Ambiguity equilibrium: Candidates who prefer A/E or B/D take no position, and candidates who prefer C reveal their preferred policies. The median voter prefers a candidate who takes no position to a candidate who reveals B/D.
The following lemma gives the posterior beliefs that voters hold, given that candidates who prefer both A/E and B/D choose to take no position.
Lemma 2 Suppose that in equilibrium, only candidates who prefer C reveal their preferred
policies. Then,
A Bayesian voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no position:
A cursed voter believes the following about a candidate who takes no position:
In this case, there will be uncertainty about the preferred policy of a candidate who takes no position, even if γ = 1, because more than one type chooses that strategy in equilibrium.
However, if γ = 1, a Bayesian would know for certain that a candidate who takes no position cannot prefer policy C. On the other hand, as before, cursed voters perceive more uncertainty than actually exists because they put some probability on a candidate who prefers C choosing to take no position.
The next proposition establishes that choosing to remain ambiguous cannot benefit candidates that prefer B/D when voters are Bayesians.
Proposition 3
In the limit as γ → 1, the ambiguity equilibrium does not exist as a BayesNash equilibrium.
First, note that this result does not necessarily hold outside of the limit case. If a Bayesian believed that only candidates who prefer C would choose to reveal their preferred policies, she would know that a candidate who took no position was very likely to prefer B/D or A/E.
However, if the probability that a candidate will be prevented from making an announcement is high (γ is low), then a candidate who took no position is only somewhat more likely to Therefore, in the limit as γ goes to one, the ambiguity equilibrium does not exist as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
In contrast, when appealing to cursed voters, candidates who prefer B/D may choose to remain ambiguous.
Proposition 4 In the limit as γ → 1, the ambiguity equilibrium exists as a cursed equilibrium if and only if
As was the case with χ N R above, it will be shown in Proposition 5 that χ A ∈ (0, 1) when
. When this holds, there does exist a threshold value of cursedness; if the median voter's degree of cursedness is above the threshold, then the ambiguity equilibrium exists, even in the limit as γ approaches one.
If the median voter is sufficiently cursed, she believes that a candidate who took no position is fairly likely to prefer C, because she does not fully appreciate how candidate preferences affect their strategy choices. These distorted beliefs lead her to prefer a candidate who took no position to a candidate who revealed a preference for B/D. In response to the median voter's behavior, a candidate who prefers B/D optimally chooses to take no position, rather than announcing his policy preference.
In parallel to the case when the near-revelation equilibrium must exist, the fact that
implies that, in this case, the ambiguity equilibrium does not exist for any degree of cursedness.
The next proposition establishes the conditions under which the near-revelation and ambiguity equilibrium are unique. As is clear from the conditions discussed above, the nearrevelation equilibrium is the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the limit as γ → 1. However, depending on the value of χ, there may be multiple cursed equilibria.
Proposition 5
, then:
(a) 0¡χ A < χ N R < 1
(b) The near-revelation equilibrium is unique if and only if
χ < χ A ≡ π A (u 2 − u 3 ) π C (π A (u 2 − u 3 ) + (1 − π C ) (u 1 − u 2 ))
(c) The ambiguity equilibrium is unique if and only if
χ > χ N R ≡ (u 2 − u 3 ) (1 − π A ) (u 2 − u 3 ) + π C (u 1 − u 2 ) (d
) The near-revelation and ambiguity equilibria both exist (and no other equilibria exist) if and only if χ
, then the near-revelation equilibrium is unique if χ < 1, and both the near-revelation equilibrium and the ambiguity equilibrium exist if χ = 1.
If
π A π C > u 1 −u 2 u 2 −u 3
, then the near-revelation equilibrium is unique, for all values of χ.
Let χ N R (π) denote the threshold value of χ that determines whether the near-revelation equilibrium exists, and let χ A (π) denote the threshold value of χ that determines whether the ambiguity equilibrium exists. The next set of results show how these thresholds are affected by changes in the distribution of candidate preferences and voters' risk preferences.
To analyze the effect of changing the distribution of candidate preferences, the next proposition considers an increase in the share of extremists, while reducing shares of moderates and centrists in fixed proportions.
Proposition 6
Suppose that π A increases by ε, while π B decreases by λε and π C decreases
Recall that an increase in χ N R implies that the near-revelation equilibrium is more likely to exist; similarly, an increase in χ A implies that the ambiguity equilibrium is less likely to exist. This occurs when voters are less likely to vote for candidates who take no position. The distribution of policy preferences matters in a straightforward way. If candidates who prefer A make up a larger fraction of the candidate pool, then it is more likely that a candidate who takes no position has that preferred position (and less likely that he has a position that is better for the median voter). Thus, a voter must really not understand the link between candidate type and strategy if she is still willing to vote for a candidate who takes no position.
The following proposition examines the role of risk-aversion in electoral outcomes. This paper defines one set of preferences u as more risk-averse than another set of preferences v if and only if the certainty equivalent of any lottery is lower under u than under v.
Proposition 7 Suppose that utility function u represents more risk-averse preferences than utility function v. Then χ N R and χ A are higher under u than under v.
The ambiguity equilibrium requires that voters vote for a candidate who takes no position over a candidate who announces B/D. If a voter is too risk-averse, then even if cursedness leads her to believe that a candidate who takes no position is more likely to be a centrist than the candidate actually is, the voter may still be reluctant to take the risk associated with voting for the candidate who took no position. Cursedness and risk aversion thus work in opposite directions.
In this game, risk aversion of candidates does not play a role. Since a candidate will implement his preferred policy regardless of the strategy that he chooses, the two possible outcomes are winning the election and implementing his preferred policy and losing the election and having the opponent's preferred policy implemented. A candidate has the same ranking of his opponent's preferred possible preferred policies as the median voter does; Candidate 1 and the median voter prefer C to D and prefer D to E. This implies that there is no incentive for the candidate to decrease his overall winning probability in order to ensure that he defeats a certain type; if he is able to defeat the opponent candidate who is closest to his ideal point, he will also be able to defeat more extreme opponents. In sum, a candidate simply maximizes his probability of winning the election; there is no risk-return trade-off.
Welfare
Proposition 5 showed that for a range of parameter values, the ambiguity equilibrium exists if the median voter is sufficiently cursed, while the near-revelation equilibrium exists if the median voter holds beliefs that are sufficiently close to Bayesian. Given that cursedness may lead to the ambiguity equilibrium being played instead of the near-revelation equilibrium, it is natural to consider the welfare consequences.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the near-revelation equilibrium exists as a Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium and the ambiguity equilibrium exists as a cursed equilibrium. Then, as γ → 1,
• The expected utility for players that prefer C and B/D is higher in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium than in the cursed equilibrium.
• The expected utility for players that prefer A/E is higher in the Bayes-Nash equilibrium than in the cursed equilibrium if and only if
Note that, while the analysis focused on the median voter, who prefers C, other voters are distributed across the policy space. Therefore, one may care about the welfare effects on players that prefer B/D and A/E not because one cares about the candidates' welfare, but because many voters also hold those preferred policies. Proposition 8 applies in the case
, when the cursed equilibrium is the ambiguity equilibrium (for sufficiently high χ), while the near-revelation equilibrium is the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Note that in the limit as γ approaches one, the near-revelation equilibrium necessarily exists as a BayesNash equilibrium, but the ambiguity equilibrium may not exist as a cursed equilibrium for some parameter values. However, in the case when cursedness matters, the expected electoral outcome is worse for voters if the median voter is cursed than when she is Bayesian.
Suppose that Candidate 1 prefers B and Candidate 2 prefers E. If the median voter knew these preferences, she would prefer to elect Candidate 1. If Candidate 1 chooses to announce his preferred policy, then, given that the median voter's beliefs about his strategy are correct, Candidate 1 would be elected if she is able to announce and will win with probability 
Commitment Game
While it may be reasonable to assume that candidates will always implement their preferred policies, it may be possible for a candidate to credibly make a binding commitment to instead put into place a different policy. This section considers the robustness of the results from the announcement game to the alternative assumption that candidates may make binding commitments to any policy. The structure of this game differs from the announcement game only in the campaign stage:
Stage 1 : The candidates simultaneously choose campaign strategies. Candidate 1 may choose to make a binding commitment to policy A, B, or C or to take no position; Candidate 2 may choose to commit to policy C, D, or E or to take no position.
If a candidate is able to make a commitment to voters, he must implement the policy to which he committed if elected. If not, including if Nature prevented a commitment from being observed, he is free to implement his preferred policy if he wins the election.
Formally, a strategy for Candidate 1, σ 1 (θ 1 ), is a mapping from preferred policy θ 1 ∈ {A, B, C} to campaign action a 1 ∈ {A, B, C, ∅}; he may choose to commit to any policy 6 or to take no position. As in the announcement game, a strategy for Candidate 2 is defined analogously. Definitions of Bayes-Nash and cursed equilibrium are not repeated here, as they are identical to those for the announcement game. The candidate strategies defined here simply replace the strategies with the limited action space defined in the announcement game.
Much of the intuition from the simpler announcement game described in the previous section also carries through. While the candidates have different incentives, the median voter's decision problem has not changed. Beliefs conditional on equilibrium strategies of candidates are not affected by the set of strategies that were not chosen. As in the announcement game, voters' beliefs about the preferred policy of a candidate who makes a policy commitment continue to be irrelevant. In this case, it is because commitments are binding. For instance, if a voter believes that no candidate will commit to A/E but observes that a candidate does so, her beliefs about the candidate who chose this off-path strategy do not affect her voting decision. In addition, the comparative statics regarding how risk aversion and the distribution of candidate preferences affect the relationship between cursedness and the decision to vote for a candidate who takes no position and a candidate who commits to B/D continue to hold.
Since candidates now have the option of committing to policies that are not their preferred policies, more equilibria are possible. In particular, there now exists a trade-off between choosing a strategy that would allow the candidate to implement a more preferred policy and choosing a strategy that would give the candidate a greater chance of winning the election 7 . Characterizing these equilibria requires more work; to show the existence of a particular equilibrium, it is necessary to show that each type of candidate would not choose to deviate to any strategy in the now expanded strategy space. This paper restricts attention to equilibria in pure strategies.
As was the case in the announcement game, candidates who prefer C will commit to C. While these candidates now have the option of committing to other policies, these other policies are less preferred by both the candidate and the voters; therefore, expanding the strategy space has no effect on these candidates. It also remains true that candidates who prefer A/E will not commit to A/E, for the same reason that they would not reveal A/E in the announcement game. Additionally, no type of candidate will commit to A/E, because doing so would be even less advantageous for a candidate who prefers a policy that is closer to what the voter prefers than A/E. Keeping these properties in mind allows one to consider fewer cases when analyzing possible equilibria. Equilibria will differ in terms of the strategies chosen by candidates who prefer B/D and A/E. This section begins with a discussion of when the near-revelation and ambiguity equilibria introduced in the previous section also exist in the commitment game.
Proposition 9
In the limit as γ → 1, the near-revelation equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions hold:
Equation 3 ensures that voters vote for a candidate who committed to B/D when the opponent took no position; it is the condition that established the existence of the nearrevelation equilibrium in the announcement game. Note that this implies that, when voters are Bayesians, this condition will always hold in the limit as γ → 1. Cursedness affects the equilibrium played only through this condition; the others ensure that candidates do not deviate to other strategies. Since it is assumed that candidates are Bayesians, conditional on the median voter's equilibrium strategy, the candidates' decisions do not depend on χ.
Equations 4, 5 and 6 ensure that a candidate who prefers B/D will not deviate to committing to C, that a candidate who prefers A/E will not deviate to committing to C, and that a candidate who prefers A/E will not deviate to committing to B/D, respectively. A candidate who prefers B/D has no incentive to deviate to taking no position because by doing so, he would not affect the policy that he would implement conditional on winning and he would decrease his probability of winning.
In the announcement game, each candidate would implement his preferred policy regardless of the strategy chosen; he could only choose whether or not to announce that policy to voters before the election took place. In contrast, a candidate in the commitment game may choose to commit to a policy that is not his preferred policy in order to increase his chance of winning the election, thereby preventing his opponent from implementing an even worse alternative.
Risk aversion has an important effect on candidates' incentives, by influencing how candidates view the trade-off between the probability of winning the election and the payoff conditional on winning. Compared to other equilibria discussed below in which all types of candidates make commitments, the near-revelation equilibrium requires that a candidate who prefers A/E choose a more risky strategy. By doing so, he can win the election if he faces an opponent who has also taken no position, though, even if that happens, he still wins only half of the time. However, when he wins, he is able to implement his preferred policy.
If he deviated to a less risky strategy, such as committing to B/D, he would win the election with higher probability, but he would have to implement a less-preferred policy if elected.
The following result establishes the conditions under which the ambiguity equilibrium exists in the commitment game.
Proposition 10
In the limit as γ → 1, the ambiguity equilibrium exists if and only if the following conditions hold:
Given that equations 8 and 9 hold, candidates who prefer B/C and A/E, respectively, cannot improve their expected payoffs by deviating to committing to C. Neither candidate can benefit by deviating to committing to B/D because, by doing so, a candidate would decrease his probability of winning the election without increasing his payoff conditional on winning.
Equation 7 The remaining results in this section provide conditions under which equilibria that involve strategies that were not feasible in the announcement game exist. The discussion begins with definitions of these new possible equilibria. 
As described above, the ambiguity equilibrium may not exist because candidates who prefer B/D have an incentive to deviate to committing to C. The difference between the near-centrist equilibrium and the ambiguity equilibrium in terms of strategies is that the candidates who prefer B/D commit to C in equilibrium, even though voters continue to favor a candidate who took no position over a candidate who committed to B/D. In the announcement game, such voter behavior always led candidates that prefer B/D to take no position, resulting in the ambiguity equilibrium. However, once candidates are able to make commitments, candidates that prefer B/D respond to these beliefs by instead committing to policy C if they are sufficiently risk-averse. Taking no position and pooling with candidates that prefer A/E in order to implement his preferred policy if he wins is a risky strategy, compared to committing to C and receiving his second-best alternative for certain.
Choosing to commit to the median voter's preferred policy, as all candidates do in the centrist equilibria, is a safe strategy. When γ < 1, candidates may have incentives to deviate because, given that all other candidates are committing to C, there is no downside risk associated with deviating to B/D or no position. Either the opponent commits to C (resulting in the same outcome regardless of the potential deviator's behavior) or the opponent is prevented from taking no position, giving a candidate who deviates a chance to win and implement his preferred policy. However, this potential gain from deviating disappears in the limit as γ → 1.
The centrist and centrist-B behavior differ only in the voter behavior. Note that in this equilibrium, as well as in other equilibria in which all candidates choose to make commitments, voters' decisions are driven entirely by the distribution of candidate preferences and the voters' risk preferences. The median voter would vote for a candidate who took no position over a candidate who committed to B/D (if that off-path deviation were observed) if and only if she prefers a random draw from the distribution of candidates to having B/D implemented for certain. Cursedness can only make a candidate who took no position more attractive to voters if more extreme candidates are more likely to take no position than candidates whose preferences are more aligned with the voters'; it has no effect when all candidates choose to make commitments.
In the commitment I equilibrium, candidates who prefer B/D and A/E balance the two opposing forces of wanting to implement a policy close to their preferred policies and needing to win the election in order to do so. A candidate who prefers B/D optimizes by committing to his preferred policy, giving up some probability of winning relative to committing to policy C, while a candidate who prefers A/E commits to a policy that lies between his preferred policy and the median voter's preferred policy. In equilibrium, only centrist candidates commit to policy C. To a candidate who prefers A or B, this means that there is a fairly high probability that the opponent will commit to D, giving the candidate who prefers A or B a chance of being able to win the election and implement policy B. However, there is also a chance that the opponent will be able to implement policy D. This equilibria exists if candidates are willing to take that risk, rather than committing to the median voter's preferred policy.
For completeness, the Appendix gives conditions for the existence of two additional equilibria in pure strategies: one in which candidates who prefer B/D commit to C and candidates who prefer A/E commit to B/D (commitment II), and a counterintuitive equilibrium in which candidates who prefer B/D commit to B/D while candidates who prefer A/E commit to C (reverse commitment). However, in the limit as γ → 1, these equilibria can also only occur if preferences over policies are consistent with risk aversion in one part of the policy space and risk lovingness in another part of the policy space.
The following proposition gives a uniqueness condition that applies when candidates are risk-averse. This corresponds to the case often considered in which agents minimize a convex loss function; deviations in the neighborhood of the preferred policy do not result in large utility losses, but larger deviations have much greater impacts. In the limit as γ approaches one, all candidates choose to commit to the median voter's preferred policy if they are risk-averse. Cursedness still makes taking no position more attractive; in the near-centrist equilibrium, voters would prefer a candidate who takes no position to one who commits to B/D, even though only extremists choose to take no position in equilibrium. However, taking no position is too risky, given that the safer strategy of committing to the voter's ideal point is available. In the announcement game, candidates who prefer B/D or A/E could only choose between risky strategies; in that environment, cursedness plays an important role in determining whether moderate candidates choose to reveal their preferences to voters or to taken no position. In contrast, when candidates can make credible commitments to any policy, risk-averse candidates choose to commit to policy C, regardless of the voters' degree of cursedness.
Conclusion
To summarize, this paper shows how the outcome of elections can be affected if voters do not understand the strategic incentives faced by candidates. If a candidate does not take a position, voters should infer something about his preferred policy from this action, assuming that candidates are not so risk-averse that they all commit to moderate or centrist policies.
However, if voters do not make these inferences, then a candidate may respond by taking no position, even when he prefers a moderate policy.
A key difference between the stylized model and a real-world election is that, in actual elections, it is not always clear whether a candidate has taken no position on an issue or has not discussed a particular issue simply because it is not salient. In the model, there was a single policy dimension, and it was common knowledge that candidates would, with some objective probability, have the opportunity to commit to a position. Theoretically, the noise introduced in the model by randomly preventing candidates from committing works in a similar way as noise in the real world generated by uncertainty about issue salience.
Think of candidates as having made a decision about a position (or lack thereof) on each issue at the beginning of the campaign. With some probability, an issue gains attention and the candidate's strategy is enacted. If not, voters do not observe that the candidate has taken a position on the issue. For example, if voters do not observe a candidate make a statement about international trade policy, they would be uncertain about whether the candidate has a campaign plank on this issue that has not been revealed because of lack of media attention to the issue or whether the candidate intends not to take a position on trade policy. The primary difference here is that different types of issues have a different probability of being made salient. For instance, in modern U.S. elections, the probability that attention will be drawn to a candidate's position on moral issues such as abortion and gay marriage approaches one, while it is much less likely that the media will focus on potential nominees to obscure positions.
Additionally, candidates may be heterogeneous with respect to other characteristics that voters care about, such as integrity or decisiveness. Since such traits may also affect a candidate's decision about whether to remain ambiguous, a platform of "no position" can be a signal of both policy preference and other character traits. For example, a candidate who faces internal costs when making decisions about taking action may also face similar costs when deciding which policy to espouse during a campaign; taking no position would then be a signal of indecisiveness. An extension of the model to this more complicated signaling game is left for future work.
All unraveling arguments rely heavily on people's understanding of the incentives involved. While this idea was applied here to study political campaigns, it is relevant to many economic phenomena. An existing literature studies disclosure of various types of information, from reviews by film critics (Brown, Camerer and Lovallo (2012) ) to the quality and safety of a firm's products (Dranove and Jin (2010) ). It also has applications to lemons markets and auctions in which the seller has private information about the value of the good.
If sellers are able to exploit individuals who are not able to understand this logic, then the standard information revelation results disappear. Further research is needed to determine how the presence of cursed individuals in a market can affect outcomes if some or even most people are Bayesians.
